“Changing banking for good”—the title of the UK Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards’ landmark 2013 report—captures an objective that has informed the international regulatory response to individual accountability in banking since the Global Financial Crisis. Beginning with the United Kingdom’s Senior Managers Regime, several jurisdictions, including Australia, Singapore and, most recently, Ireland, have introduced dedicated regimes designed to strengthen the individual accountability of senior bank managers. Following the collapse of Credit Suisse, Switzerland has moved in the same direction. In August 2026, the Federal Council concretized its proposal for a Senior Managers Regime that combines core features of these regimes with existing Swiss supervisory mechanisms. This article assesses the proposed Swiss regime through a behavioral and comparative lens. It argues that individual accountability may influence managerial conduct through two complementary mechanisms: the deterrent and expressive functions of law. While the clearer attribution of responsibility may facilitate supervision and enforcement and thereby strengthen deterrence, the regime’s other major contribution may lie in making individual responsibility more salient to senior managers. By clearly allocating and communicating responsibilities, a dedicated accountability regime can reinforce normative expectations regarding responsible managerial conduct, mitigate the diffusion of responsibility within complex organizations and foster a culture of accountability. Comparative experience nevertheless shows that such regimes can impose significant administrative burdens, making proportionate implementation essential. Moreover, robust independent empirical evidence on their effectiveness remains limited, leaving open whether such regimes—including the proposed Swiss regime—can ultimately contribute to “changing banking for good”.