Content

1. Introduction
2. The Indo-Pacific takes centre stage
3. Trade policy becoming part of foreign policy
4. Value vs. interest driven policies?
5. ‘Cooperative’ instead of ‘strategic’ autonomy leading to strategic
   responsibility
6. European Union – finally becoming a global player?
7. It’s technology, stupid!
8. Fair financial contributions for essential public goods in times
   of budgetary constraints
9. Conclusions

A. Introduction

Since the 2016 Global Strategy^[1]A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy (2016); at <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/global-strategy-european-unions-foreign-andsecurity-policy_en>. the EU is on a journey to become a more active and particularly more recognised global player, recognising that security has become indivisible and that this needs a comprehensive engagement, in Asia and the Indo-Pacific region respectively. Russia’s war of aggression and the need to repel this attack on European ground puts the EU’s commitment as well as capacity to deliver at a test. A test not to fail otherwise the reputational damage will be great, all the talk about ‘strategic autonomy’ futile and the dependence on the US to deepen.

Thereby the EU needs to overcome an erroneous perception that it is a newcomer to Asia and that it has neglected the region because of a too narrow European perspective.

Building on the Global Strategy, the EU recognised that security between Europe and Asia is intertwined as evidenced by the project of ‘Enhancing security cooperation in and with Asia’^[2]Council of the European Union (2018). Enhanced EU Security Cooperation in and with Asia – Council conclusions. 28 May 2018; at st09265-re01-en18.pdf (europa.eu) Based on this policy paper is … Continue reading, well before the accentuation of the Sino-US conflict and Russia’s war of aggression against the Ukraine. In a series of EU policy papers, the Connectivity Strategy was next, followed by the mentioned Indo-Pacific Strategy and its operational arm, the Global Gateway. The Indo-Pacific’s primordial security dimension was confirmed by the Strategic Compass^[3]The European Union (2022). A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence. At <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/strategic_​compass_​en3_​web.​pdf>., the EU’s first fully fledged security strategy. This geo-political strategy was complemented by the Commission geo-economic proposal of another ‘first’ in June 2023, the Economic Security Strategy^[4]Joint Communication (2023). European Economic Security Strategy. 20 June 2023; at <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52023JC0020>.. These documents add up to a comprehensive policy framework for policy making applicable to the Indo-Pacific, which now needs just the crucial element, its implementation.

Historically, although often forgotten, the creation of ASEM, the Asia Europe Meeting in 1996 with ASEAN, was an early step in recognition of ‘ASEAN centrality’ – already at a time before this term has become popular. It was also a conscious measure to add the missing link Europe-Asia in the triangle Europe-America-Asia formed by the Transatlantic cooperation plus NATO and APEC, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, respectively.

This shows that there is a noticeable intensification of relations in pursuit of the 2016 EU Global Strategy, on the bilateral and regional level. Bilaterally, the relationship with China came to a turning point in 2019 when the important economic partner was characterised by the tryptic “partner, competitor, sys­temic rival”^[5]EU-China – A strategic outlook. 12 March 2019; at <https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2019-03/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf>.. Germany, with longstanding commercial interests primarily but not only because of the automotive industry, has finally endorsed this policy with its own first comprehensive strategy on China^[6]Federal Foreign Office (2023). Germany adopts its first comprehensive Strategy on China, 13 July 2023; at … Continue reading, trying to balance de-risking with managing risk without being blue-eyed.

The relationship with Japan was elevated to the strategic level with the simultaneous conclusion of the Strategic and Economic Strategic Part­ner­ships. This followed on the comprehensive strategic partnership with the Republic of Korea. South Korea is still the only country with which the EU has concluded a political, a crisis management (security) and free trade agreement. In 2023 the European Union (EU) and the Republic of Korea memorialize 60 years of diplomatic relations. They also decided to start negotiations on a digital trade agreement, closing a lacuna in the FTA. Korea has already acceded to the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) of Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore. The EU also plans to negotiate a digital trade agreement with Singapore which offers the possibility to connect the various countries in a network diplomacy.

In 2022 the EU and ASEAN had held the first summit^[7]Joint Leaders’ Statement, 14 December 2022; at <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/60846/eu-asean-leaders-statement.pdf>. to celebrate 45 years of the dialogue partnership and up-graded their relationship to a strategic one – the eleventh for the EU and the fifth in Asia, in addition to China, Japan, South Korea, India.

B. The Indo-Pacific takes centre stage

In order to underline the importance attached to the Indo-Pacific, the EU convened the first EU Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forum in Paris on 22 February 2022 to foster cooperation as outlined in the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy^[8]EEAS (2021). EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. 16 September 2021; at … Continue reading and the Global Gateway^[9]European Commission/High Representative (2021). The Global Gateway. 1 December 2021; at <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021JC0030>. See also European Commission … Continue reading Strategy. Enhanced cooperation in security and defence, connectivity and digital transition and partnerships and global challenges like climate change, fisheries and joint research and innovation were covered^[10]EEAS (2022). Ministerial Forum for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. 22 February 2022; at <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/ministerial-forum-cooperation-indo-pacific_en>..

The participants in the second EU Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forum in Stockholm, 13 May 2023^[11]EEAS (2023). EU Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forum: Co-chairs’ press release, 13 May 2023; at <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-indo-pacific-ministerial-forum-co-chairs’-press-release_en>., recognised that their prosperity and security are interconnected, vowed to continue their growing engagement on a broad range of traditional and non-traditional security and defence-related issues, such as maritime security, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, crisis man­age­ment, hybrid threats and transnational crime. European participants made known that they had “stepped up security-related activities through the EU funded project ‘Enhancing Security Cooperation in and with Asia’” (ESIWA)^[12]EEAS (2019). Enhancing Security Cooperation in and with Asia. Factsheet; at … Continue reading, which covers four thematic areas: counterterrorism, cybersecurity, maritime security and crisis management. Concerning fake news, i.e., Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), the EU seeks bilateral and regional cooperation with several partners.

Against the background of the Sino-US competition as well as the war in the Ukraine, participants in the 2023 Forum agreed on the “need to improve trusted connectivity between Indo-Pacific countries … aiming to reinforce the resilience of global and regional supply networks, and to better protect against future disruption and create new economic opportunities with value-adding investments, including through the EU Global Gateway initiative.”

The Global Gateway serves as an update to the original Connectivity Strat­egy^[13]European Commission/High Representative (2018). Connecting Europe and Asia – Building blocks for an EU Strategy. 19 September 2018; at … Continue reading. Crucially, it adds financial means to empower the EU take up the systemic challenge posed by China^[14]Michael Reiterer (2023). From Connectivity to Global Gateway, from Asia to the Indo-Pacific – building an Inclusive Liberal International Order in Shiong Kim, Michael Reiterer (eds.) Connecting … Continue reading. It is “new in two ways: It is an attempt to internalize the logic of strategic competition when making decisions about connectivity; and it is an attempt to increase EU visibility through better branding.”^[15]Jacob Mardell (2021). Global Gateway – the European Union’s new connectivity strategy. MERICS – Comment, 12 October 2021; at … Continue reading

At the 2023 Vilnius Summit, NATO confirmed the importance of Indo-Pacific “given that developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security. We welcome the contribution of our partners in the Asia-Pacific region – Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea – to security in the Euro-Atlantic, including their commitment to supporting Ukraine. We will further strengthen our dialogue and cooperation to tackle our shared security challenges, including on cyber defence, technology and hybrid, underpinned by our shared commitment to upholding international law and the rules-based international order.”^[16]NATO (2023). Vilnius Summit Communiqué. 11 July 2023; at <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm>. The situation in China provides the context: “The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values. We remain open to constructive engagement with the PRC, including to build reciprocal transparency, with a view to safeguarding the Alliance’s security interests.”^[17]Ibid. While this outreach does not amount to NATO increasing membership or extending its direct area of operations, it reflects the indivisibility of security and opens the door for closer cooperation with Japan, Korea, Australia and New Zealand, a move criticised by China. With “no other … partner closer to NATO”^[18]Reuters (2023). Japan and NATO agree on new partnership programme at NATO Vilnius summit. 12 July 2023; at … Continue reading, a new partnership program with Japan was concluded ahead of the summit, with or without a NATO representation in Tokyo, blocked by France.

C. Trade policy becoming part of foreign policy

The mentioned policy papers reflect the EU’s willingness to become a global player also in areas which geographically appear far away. To this end it will draw on its long-standing trade and economic relationships but add a robust political and security dimension which includes hard security elements. Recognising the return of geopolitics the former policy of treating trade policy apart is no longer a viable approach in times of geoeconomics.

The economic dimension is the fundament of EU power and influence and needs operationalisation. This is crucial in the unfolding trade and technological tensions and conflicts, the need to re-organise energy supply as well as production and value chains to achieve greater resilience. All these measures are necessary to meet the challenges of the emerging technologies and the weaponisation of the hitherto independent policies. This carries weight as the EU is the major trade and investment partner for practically all countries in the Indo-Pacific.

These facts are not always appreciated as the EU is often taken for granted as a partner, who is not resorting to pressuring partners into agreements or updates of existing ones. The rapid revision of the US-Korea FTA in 2018 is a pertinent example of diplomacy by pressure. To correct this perception and to pursue EU-interests more vigorously and effectively, the European Commission updated in 2021 its trade policy through the “Trade Policy Review – An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy”, based on a wide survey of interested parties. At the heart of the Strategy is “a tougher, more assertive approach towards the implementation and enforcement of its trade agreements, fighting unfair trade and addressing sustainability concerns. The EU is stepping up its efforts to ensure that its agreements deliver the negotiated benefits for its workers, farmers and citizens.”^[19]European Commission (2021) “Commission sets course for an open, sustainable and assertive EU trade policy”, Press Release 18 February 2021; at … Continue reading This approach which will be reinforced by the mentioned Economic Security Strategy facilitates actions by the EU to counter Chinese statecraft measures.

Interdependence matters, in terms of economics and politics. This message was driven home by the COVID-19 pandemic which interrupted production chains and raised awareness for the need to secure essential products in times of crisis.

Thus, the EU will have to leverage its strength, also considering the Sino-US power competition, the Sino-Russian cooperation to build a new international order^[20]Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development. 4 February 2022; at … Continue reading, in defining its own policies, based on a serious analysis of its own economic and security interests. This endeavour is often referred to in an often-misleading manner^[21]The misleading characterisation was reconfirmed in the aftermath of the visit of President Macron to China in April 2023. as searching for or establishing “strategic au­ton­omy”.

Concluding additional political and economic/trade agreements serves this purpose. The restart of trade negotiations with India, the intensification of the talks with Australia (ongoing since 2018) and striving for progress with Indonesia and Malaysia are part of this policy. Thailand, although not back to full democracy will profit from the geopolitical situation and talks are expected to resume soon. Similarly with the Philippines, simmering since 2015. An EU-ASEAN agreement providing a regional overarching framework is envisaged and part of the recently concluded strategic partnership.

However, the absence of the EU from the large regional trade agreements, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Com­pre­hen­sive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), risks to put the EU in a disadvantageous position in standard setting, an essential feature of these regional agreements^[22]Michael Reiterer (2022). Regional trade agreements in the IndoPacific: does the EU risk losing sight of their importance?. CSDS Policy Brief 1/2022, 28 January 2022; at … Continue reading. China uses its participation in RCEP to this end and intends to join CPTPP too. The UK in its post-Brexit drive to secure market access is the first European country to join^[23]U.K. formally joins CPTPP to little fanfare and low expectations; Nikkei Asia, 16 July 2023; at … Continue reading. The EU pursued a bilateral approach and has concluded trade agreements with Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Singapore and New Zealand^[24]This website offers an overview of free trade agreements concluded or under negotiation. European Commission. Negotiations and agreements; at … Continue reading. The above-mentioned start of negotiations of a digital trade agreement with South Korea and Singapore is a necessary catchup activity I have advocated for South Korea^[25]EU Requests Korea-EU FTA Modernization. Business Korea, 8 April 2019; at <http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=30655>..

It needs to be stressed that participation in economic agreements is no longer an economic or trade matter only, but an important geoeconomic measure and policy tool to pursue national interests including security.

A positive example is the Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement, con­cluded between the EU and ASEAN. While negotiations on an interregional trade agreement between the EU and ASEAN were ridden with difficulties in the past, this is the first of its kind in international relations, laying proof that inter-regional agreements are possible to reach, also in highly technical matters like aviation. As an open skies’ agreement, it “replaces more than 140 bilateral air services agreements, thereby providing a single set of rules and reducing red tape. EU Members States without any bilateral agreements with ASEAN States are now also covered by a modern legal framework. All EU airlines will be able to operate direct flights from any airport in the EU to all airports in ASEAN States, and vice versa for ASEAN airlines. This will help EU and ASEAN airlines to compete with competitors targeting the lucrative EUASEAN market.”^[26]European Commission (2022). “Aviation: Landmark EU–ASEAN agreement to connect 1.1 billion people”, Press Release, 17 October 2022; at … Continue reading

D. Value vs. interest driven policies?

The ideological underpinning of this Sino-US competition is formed by the dichotomy between democracy and autocracy/dictatorship which gives rise to concerns about a new cold war – a concern which has been partly overtaken by the nightmare of a hot war in the Ukraine.

While this challenge persists, it creates an additional challenge: the costs of a value driven policy, if not fully aligned with national interests, puts the very policy at risk.

Democracies must explain and justify policies and may be forced to adjust or change because of democratic political processes. Thus, the element of pursuing (hopefully well-defined) national interests has become more acute. The cost-benefit relationship in pursuing them needs to be better explained to citizens. Otherwise, the calls ‘this is not our struggle’, ‘this is not our war’ will not only become louder but will determine politics and therefore policies.

Short-term costs and long-term gains are always difficult to explain and to shoulder. Without leadership, nationalistic and retro-oriented policies will prevail with an aggressive potential. “Make country X great again” – at the costs of others – has the potential of becoming a wider spread policy leading to segmentation in the international system.

E. ‘Cooperative’ instead of ‘strategic’ autonomy leading to strategic responsibility

While clearly allies of the US, the EU, Japan and South Korea share the interest to keep lines of communication with China open and continue a mutually beneficial relationship in applying the tryptic characterisation of China as ‘partner, competitor, systemic rival’. The EU should engage China bilaterally. Enlarging to trilateral meetings in including the U.S., Japan, and South Korea respectively and eventually enlarged to quadrilateral with India. This could contribute to building a commonly shared basis of mutual interests, in terms of economy, environment, climate change. These interactions could also serve to rebuilding trust among participants which has diminished over the last years.

To this end, efforts to strengthen military capabilities and secure supply and production lines and open trade and technology ecosystems, to enhance resilience, not isolationism or protectionism, are necessary. These are elements to build a “cooperative autonomy”, a more appropriate term than ‘strategic autonomy’, which gave rise to misunderstandings in the sense of isolationism or decoupling of Europe from the US or NATO. This should lead to a “strategic responsibility” which carries the message that this does not come cost-free but means providing the means necessary to achieve the envisaged goals. The essence of such a policy of cooperation to achieve autonomy should also be of interest to Japan and South Korea.

A stronger partner who is capable to shoulder more responsibility is a more valuable partner; a partner is not a subordinate receiving instructions, but a contributor to developing a common policy which of course implies finding common ground as interests do not merge even among allies. Reaching out to like-minded partners where possible, cooperating with rivals where necessary is a viable maxim.

This maxim also indicates the limits of what used to be called the ‘liberal international order’. This should not ring the death bell for ‘order’, but the cooperative element is certainly weakened as the rise of re-shoring, protectionism, isolationism, and nationalism indicate. However, ultimately, globalised as the economy has grown over decades which cannot be reversed in the short-term and the very nature of problems which cannot be solved nationally, like climate change, will ensure that an interest-based, albeit reduced cooperation will continue.

F. European Union – finally becoming a global player?

The EU’s reputation and endeavour to become a global actor has always suffered from the paradox, that despite East Asia turning into an economic powerhouse and the EU being the largest economy and leading or major investor, strength and influence were primarily measured in Asia in military terms. While this was partly due to the continuation of the Cold War in East Asia after it had subsided in Europe, it got new traction through the comprehensive resurgence of China and its more assertive policies, especially militarily.

The EU’s response is therefore to engage more beyond economics, a policy and diplomacy it is learning. Focusing on non-traditional security issues emerging from the Korean Peninsula – pursuing cyber criminals on Chinese and North Korean territory, fighting, and joining means to contain Chinese dis­in­for­ma­tion, engaging in cyber^[27]See Gertjan Boulet, Michael Reiterer, Ramon Pacheco Pardo eds. (2022). Cybersecurity Policy in the EU and South Korea from Consultation to Action. Palgrave. as well as in maritime security, adding autonomous sanctions on the DPRK and providing capacity building for others to implement such sanctions more efficiently, are examples illustrating this approach.

Planning to be prepared for a “Taiwan contingency”^[28]Henry Boyd, Franz-Stefan Gady, Oskar Glaese, Meia Nouwens, Benjamin Schreer (2022). Taiwan, Cross-strait Stability and European Security: Implications and Response Options. IISS, March 2022; at … Continue reading is part of this evolution towards a security provider. The difficulty of finding common ground was recently highlighted by President Macron’s opinion that such a conflict would not be Europe’s call while HRVP Borrell advocated European navies patrolling the straits to “signify Europe’s commitment to freedom of navigation in this absolutely crucial area”^[29]Politico (2023). Send warships to Taiwan Strait, Borrell urges EU governments. 23 April 2023; at <https://www.politico.eu/article/china-joseb-taiwan-borrell-eu-warships-to-patrol-strait/>..

As in the past, it was a crisis, the war in the Ukraine which provided the EU with the opportunity to show that it is able and willing to move beyond the traditional approach: in addition to severe sanctions on Russia, the EU directly funded arms, military equipment, including lethal weaponry destined for the Ukraine, a country in war as a defender against Russian aggression, for the first time in its history. In making use of its Peace Facility^[30]European Peace Facility: Ukraine and beyond. European Parliament Research Service, 18 November 2022; at <https://epthinktank.eu/2022/11/18/european-peace-facility-ukraine-and-beyond/>. to this end, the message was also sent that you must defend peace also when it has been broken. Spending € 3 billion, split between lethal equipment and platforms (€ 2.82 billion) and non-lethal support (€ 0.18 billion), is a significant contribution.

The Indo-Pacific Strategy added military elements, such as the coordinated deployment of single European frigates to the region and extending CARICOM II to Southeast Asia. While the challenge is on to implement these and other measures and to maintain the European engagement despite the war in the Ukraine, these policies potentially render the EU more relevant in and to the region but also globally.

As part of the competition for a new and adapted international system, rule and standard setting e.g., governance, in strategic fields is of primordial importance. This requires participation in regional and global endeavours. In the Indo-Pacific regional trade agreements, like the mentioned RCEP and CPTPP, are particularly important. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, an important tool for China and Russia to build a new international order according to their priorities and interests, gets involved in various forms of governance building including in the important field of cyber space.

Reviving and enlarging BRICS^[31]Japan Times (2023). BRICS considering expansion as emerging economies rally to join group. 25 May 2023; at … Continue reading including talk about a BRICS gold-backed currency based on a basket of participating countries to weaken the dominance of the US-Dollar is part of this endeavour. While the de-dol­lar­isation is politically within the logic of BRICS countries, this is a rather ambitious project^[32]BRICS foreign ministers only advocated the use of local currencies by BRICS member: “Ministers underscored the importance of encouraging the use of local currencies in international trade and … Continue reading; it plays in the hands of those in the Global South who complain of being disadvantaged by the Western Liberal International Order in general and those targeted by US-sanctions.

Global and regional respect for WTO rules is important. “Frameworks” like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, below the level of a formal FTA, risk to provide a platform for unilateral standard setting, with no or conditional market access, no MFN and without a dispute settlement procedure. This deprives weaker states of the protection of rules and regulations, the rule of law. This is also part of endeavours to create a new order instead of building on and improving the existing one.

G. It’s technology, stupid!

Absolutely crucial and linked to the standard setting is to maintain an edge in new technologies which underscores the importance of science diplomacy, making use of the EU research funding schemes, such as Horizon Europe 2020. Providing risk capital, fostering primary research and cooperation with the private sector and incentives to invest in research are crucial for the EU not to lose sight. The need to overcome the European scepticism concerning science is an important task to accomplish in an all-in approach.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has recently launched the Critical Technology Tracker^[33]ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker | Australian Strategic Policy Institute | ASPI Full report: Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong-Leung, Stephan Robin and Danielle Cave (2023) ASPI’s Critical Technology … Continue reading, an important first in international politics, which starts with a stern warning: “Western democracies are losing the global technological competition, including the race for scientific and research breakthroughs, and the ability to retain global talent—crucial ingredients that underpin the development and control of the world’s most important technologies, including those that don’t yet exist.”

Out of 44 critical technologies examined China leads in 37 technologies, with the U.S. leading in the other 7 technologies, and coming second in most of the technologies that China leads in. “For some technologies, all of the world’s top 10 leading research institutions are based in China and are collectively generating nine times more high-impact research papers than the second ranked country (most often the US). Notably, the Chinese Academy of Sciences ranks highly (and often first or second) across many of the 44 technologies included in the Critical Technology Tracker.”

According to ASPI, “the data demonstrates that the US and other democracies are being left behind in the global race for ascendancy in critical tech­nolo­gies.”^[34]David J. Bier (2023). Abandoning the US, More Scientists Go to China. Cato Institute, Blog Home, 11 April 2023; at Abandoning the US, More Scientists Go to China | Cato at Liberty Blog. The report recommends democratic nations pursue a strategic critical technology step-up through 24 policy recommendations.

Switzerland is doing in well in some areas covered by this Tracker: hypersonic detection and tracking; advanced robotics; quantum computing, com­mu­ni­ca­tion and sensors.

H. Fair financial contributions for essential public goods in times of budgetary constraints

It is necessary to continue focussing and promoting the resolve to transforming economies in order not to lose another crucial fight, the one against climate change. This necessary fight suffers a second challenge within a short time: first, the COVID-19 pandemic got all the attention and money to develop vaccines and to invest in economies to overcome the economic costs of the pandemic and to avoid a recession.

Secondly, the energy crisis due to the weaponisation of energy as part of the illegal aggression against the Ukraine by Russia, slows down the transition to renewable energies as CO2 intensive energy will not be easy to phase out as planned under the Paris Agreement. Emitting methane in large quantity because of the destruction of pipelines and additional CO2 because of burning not sellable gas aggravate the problem and could be considered as crimes in destroying public goods.

Furthermore, military spending for actual warfare and the intensification of an arms race already under way will siphon away capital needed to fight climate change to meet the commitments made in the Paris Agreement process.

Rebuilding after the various crises will further add to the financial constraints. International reconstruction, Marshall Plans, cannot be limited to the Ukraine only. The devastating earthquakes in Syria and Turkey, the failed state Lebanon, the South Sudan and Somalia, Angola, Columbia, Venezuela, Pacific Island states to name just a few examples all need attention and support^[35]CARE (2023) Breaking the Silence: The 10 most under-reported humanitarian crises of 2022. 12 January 2023; at … Continue reading e.g., inclusion of the Global South in the (Western) relief efforts.

A strategic approach is necessary to meet the challenges of Chinese com­pe­ti­tion and statecraft but also as a precautionary measure for future pandemics which will occur, which should not be blended out again (Spanish and Hongkong influenza, cholera, bubonic plague, smallpox Ebola, SARS …)^[36]Jarus Owen (2023). The worst epidemics and pandemics in history. Live Science, at <https://www.livescience.com/worst-epidemics-and-pandemics-in-history.html>..

I. Conclusions

The EU and its partners in the Indo-Pacific/Asia share similar interests in the Sino-US conflict and struggle, namely, to find solutions to match their economic interests with their security interests. Alliance structures impact on economics (geoeconomics), implementing values can conflict with economic interests and may require compromises either way. Cooperation could enlarge the collective leverage in maintaining a rules-based order, although parts of the rules require rethinking and rewriting to prevent un-order where ‘might is right’ reigns supreme. A strong cooperative element strengthens mul­ti­lat­er­al­ism to avoid minilateral directorates which are exclusive by nature and largely to the detriment of the EU (East Asia Summit, Quad, AUKUS …)

The EU is also uniquely positioned as a member in both, the G7 and G20; in Asia only Japan shares this position. This puts a special responsibility on these two strategic partners which could jointly consult with other partners in the Indo-Pacific to make their views heard as part of the necessity to include the Global South into the international governance system. To this end it is necessary to avoid a Eurocentric or Global West dominated view which prioritises problems and conflicts in the ‘West’ over those in the Global South.

The Indo-Pacific security hotspots in Asia – South and East China Sea, Taiwan Straits, Korean Peninsula – are of direct mutual importance because the EU and its partners depend on open and secure production and supply lines as well as shipping lanes to keep their economies afloat.

All these issues have a global impact, are linked to the rule of law and therefore of common concern. Niccolò Machiavelli’s policy imperative, ‘divide et impera’, whether pursued by external or internal actors, should not have a chance to succeed in weakening the EU.

As a result, the EU is on a new track after COVID and because of the Russian aggression: It has become more hard power oriented as spelt out in the Strategic Compass and demonstrated by financing for the first time ever weapons for a party in a war, the Ukraine.

A paradigm shift towards more realism without throwing idealism overboard is in the making, which needs conceptual work as started with the Strategic Compass and close cooperation in the Transatlantic and Transpacific theatres with the US and interested partners. This needs to be done in a cooperative manner where the EU pursues its own interests in a collaborative strategic autonomy which in turn must be reciprocated by partners to be viable.

Supporting or initiating diplomatic efforts by third parties to find a mutually acceptable solution to end the war in the Ukraine would create respect for an EU-diplomacy although as an indirect partner to the conflict this will not work. Candidates could be India and China, and those who are already involved like Turkey. It could also be a chance for the Global South collectively or by individual country(ies) to show leadership. However, an initiative by the Organisation of African Unity was rejected rather brutally by President Putin. Although the UN failed in the Security Council because of the involvement of the permanent member of the Council to preserve peace, it could engage in mandating the Secretary General. Last but not least, a personality, like the 8^th Secretary General of the UN, Ban Ki-moon, who also co-chairs the Elders, or the Pope supported by the experienced diplomats of the Vatican, could try to bridge the big gap.

Managing the relationship with China is another test case for the EU:

If China were to switch from its ‘pro-Russian neutrality’ in the war with the Ukraine to pro-Russia in delivering weapons to a “limitless friend in need”, this would escalate the situation further to a dangerous level. Pre-emptive diplomacy is required to avoid such an escalation. While the EU is in a difficult position to act as a mediator for a cease-fire or peace because of its military support for the Ukraine, it could work with China to this end. This could strengthen the bilateral relations between the EU and China and contribute to avoiding the sanction case described below.

If Europe joins the US in sanctioning China, either in response to the delivery of weapons, use of force against Taiwan or to exclude China from knowledge required in the new emerging technologies, the European way of engagement where possible would come to an end. This would unify China and Russia even more. While in the first two cases joining sanctions would be rather inevitable, the EU would have to consider its strategic position carefully pursuing its own interests. Trans-Atlantic coordination is required to reach a common position.

These developments signal a transition from idealism to realism: A values based foreign policy becomes more and more difficult in times of geopolitics and geoeconomics when the great power competition favours binary solutions. An old order vanning and a new one only nascent with unclear contours creates a highly volatile situation. In this process basic rules of the road are common denominator for all to avoid wars, war-like situations and ‘might is right policies’ whether in the Global South, North, East or West.

The Indo-Pacific has become the battle ground or better the arena for competition in terms of technology, resources, markets, influence and the minds of half of the world’s population.

In implementing its policy framework, the EU can overcome lingering doubts in Asia and the Indo-Pacific whether it is an actor in its own right which is able and willing to sustain two crises at the same time. This includes devoting attention, time and means to the burning problems of the Global South. The Global South is not a coherent group but is unified by frustration because of lack of influence, neglect and empty promises. Applying the policies outlined in the Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Global Gateway effectively to them would strengthen the EU’s standing, contribute to trust building and sharpen the EU’s profile as an independent player following its own compass.

After eight stunning years, the third summit of EU leaders and leaders from the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)^[37]Council of the European Union (2023). Infographic – EU-CELAC relations: facts and figures; at <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/eu-celac-relations/> (accessed 16 July … Continue reading in July 2023 in Brussels was part of this outreach. The later got a boost in reaching the agreement at the sidelines of the CELAC summit in Brussels to finally sign the post-Cotonou Agreement^[38]Spanish Presidency of the Council of the European Union (2023). The Spanish presidency promotes the signing of the Post-Cotonou Agreement. Press Release 18 July 2023; at … Continue reading, which covers Caribbean countries in the Indo-Pacific, was a positive sign.

For CELAC countries the war in the Ukraine was not the top priority at the summit, President Zelensky was not invited either. They brought their concerns and requests to the table: slavery and the trans-Atlantic slave trade were recognised as “a crime against humanity”^[39]The call for talks on economic reparations for colonization and enslavement was present but kept out of the final Declaration. See: Why Latin America still won’t condemn Putin’s war in Ukraine, … Continue reading; the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed against Cuba should be ended and the opposition to the extra-territorial effect of laws and regulations was registered. While the war in the Ukraine met with “deep concern”, Russia was not mentioned and “a just and sustainable peace” is needed as the war is “exacerbating existing fragilities in the global economy, constraining growth, increasing inflation, disrupting supply chains, heightening energy and food insecurity and elevating financial stability risks”. International financial institutions and multilateral institutions need reforms to allow “access – under favourable and transparent conditions – to the financial resources necessary to promote their (developing countries) economic stability and reduce external indebtedness, to improve the debt sustainability and build more equitable, prosperous, and just societies that contribute to sustainable development”, climate vulnerability is recognised to avoid that countries have to “to choose between fighting poverty and protecting the planet”^[40]Declaration of the EU-CELAC Summit 2023, Brussels, 18 July 2023; at <https://​www.​consilium.europa.eu/media/65920/st12000-en23.pdf>..

This very different work programme in substance and tone, offers the EU the opportunity to sharpen its own profile and live up to its intention to become a global player in its own right.

There are, however, important caveats: IF the 135 Gateway projects in the pipeline worth € 45 billion are implemented, IF the free trade agreement MERCOSUR is finally concluded by the end of 2023 and IF the EU-CELAC Roadmap 2023 to 2025^[41]EU-CELAC ROADMAP 2023 to 2025, Brussels, 18 July 2023; at <https://​www.​consilium.europa.eu/media/65921/eu-celac-roadmap2023-25.pdf>. is processed, IF climate change concerns are not flawed by paternalism, IF the quest for rare metals and minerals does not lead to extractivism but partnerships to avoid resemblance of neo-colonialism, IF many of the “recognitions” in the Declaration turn into actions.

Lesson to be learned: the countries of the Global South part of the Indo-Pacific also expect that their concerns are taking centre stage and not be treated as add-ons!

Thus, to become a global player, the EU needs first as a regional actor to become sufficiently strong to act as an independent guarantor of peace in Europe below the level of an article 5 case (collective defence) of NATO while not neglecting its interests in the Indo-Pacific. Being absent equals losing in­flu­ence – a no-go for the EU pursuing a comprehensive security.

Finally, without unity of purpose and action there will be no global player called EU, in addition to and in competition with the US and China. After all, foreign policy starts at home.